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1 Introduction 
   Most countries, particularly developed countries, have governmental or semi-governmental 
agencies which promote the international business activities of their firms. Such activities 
include foreign trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). With respect to FDI, countries have set 
up bodies to attract foreign investment countries. In fact, one key aspect of globalization is fierce 
international competition for inward FDI, which is widely viewed as beneficial for growth and 
job creation. This competition has contributed to the explosive growth of global FDI, which now 
exceeds global trade. More recently, there is a growing recognition that FDI generates benefits 
not only for host countries but for home countries as well. In particular, there are a number of 
channels through which outward FDI raises the investor’s productivity at home and thus 
contributes to the home countries’ growth and development. For example, investing abroad helps 
maximize the efficient use of capital in the source countries. To cite another example, it exposes 
the firm to the world’s best business practices which are subsequently adopted by other domestic 
firms, while the acquisition of superior foreign technology through foreign investment not only 
benefits the investor firm but also may have positive spill-over effects for the rest of the economy. 
   However, FDI is an inherently risky business activity for firms since it involves incurring large 
sunk costs such as the cost of acquiring information to overcome the lack of knowledge and 
familiarity with the local market. Put differently, asymmetric information – i.e. investors’ lack of 
knowledge about consumer preferences, suppliers and other key features of foreign markets – is 
a serious market failure which deters investment in foreign countries. In order to mitigate the 
high risks of foreign investment, some home countries have set up governmental or semi-
governmental agencies to help their firms venture abroad. Such investment promotion agencies 
(IPAs) promote outward FDI even though IPAs have traditionally been a tool for attracting 
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inward FDI. However, it is often difficult to accurately evaluate the effectiveness of IPAs in 
promoting outward FDI. More precisely, it is difficult to establish whether the presence of, say, 
Korean IPA office in, say, Thailand, encourages Korean companies to invest in Thailand. The 
biggest source of difficulty is the endogeneity problem. That is, the Korean government may 
decide to set up an IPA office in Thailand precisely because many Korean companies are 
investing in Thailand. This, in turn, may be due to good relationship between Korea and Thailand, 
or Thailand’s relatively attractive investment climate. Omitting such country pair specific 
elements and host country specific elements creates biases in OLS estimators. 
   A number of studies evaluate the role of governmental agencies in promoting the international 
business activities of firms from their countries.1 There are four types of promotion: (1) the 
promotion of imports by importing countries’ agencies, (2) the promotion of exports by 
exporting countries’ agencies, (3) the promotion of inward FDI by host countries’ agencies, and 
(4) the promotion of outward FDI by home countries’ agencies. Most of the existing studies on 
business activity promotion focus on the second and third types of promotion – i.e. promotion of 
exports and inward FDI. Studies of export promotion, which include Alvarez and Crespi (2000), 
Gil-Pareja et al. (2005), and Martincus and Carballo (2008), generally uncover a significant 
positive effect of export promotion on exports. In a significant recent study based on survey data 
covering 103 developed and developing countries, Lederman, et al. (2010) re-confirm the earlier 
finding of export promotion agencies exerting a significant positive effect on exports. They 
highlight the importance of EPA services for overcoming foreign trade barriers and solving 
asymmetric information problems associated with exports of heterogeneous goods. Studies of 
                                                              
1 Also, there are a large number of papers analyzing the effects of international organizations. For example, some 
papers examines the impacts of joining WTO on trade; Rose (2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b), Engelbrecht and Pearce 
(2007), and Subramanian and Wei (2007). Rose (2004a) obtains little evidence that countries joining or belonging to 
the GATT/WTO have very different trade patterns than outsiders. Engelbrecht and Pearce (2007) and Subramanian 
and Wei (2007) analyze the impacts of the WTO membership on agricultural trade and find their negatively 
significant impacts. 
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inward FDI promotion examine whether or not host-country governments’ efforts to attract 
foreign investors into the country are effective. By and large, those studies, which include 
Charlton and Davis (2006) and Harding and Javorcik (2010) yield a positive effect of inward FDI 
promotion on inward FDI. In contrast to the large and growing number of studies on export and 
inward FDI promotion, there are almost no studies which delve into import and outward FDI 
promotion. This is perfectly understandable since the traditional priority of governments has 
been to promote exports and inward FDI and they have only recently begun to promote imports 
and outward FDI.  
   In fact, our paper is the first paper to empirically examine the impact of outward FDI 
promotion on outward FDI. At a broader level, this is our primary contribution to the empirical 
literature on the role of government agencies in promoting the cross-border business activities of 
their firms. To shed light on the effect of outward FDI promotion, we analyze the role of the 
Japanese and Korean agencies for investment promotion – i.e. Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO) and Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA). JETRO is a government-
related organization that seeks to promote trade and investment between Japan and the rest of the 
world. Similarly, the goal of KOTRA is to facilitate trade and investment between Korea and 
other countries. In addition to their mandate and mission, the two agencies share a number of 
other common features. This is hardly surprising since Korea established KOTRA in 1962 in an 
effort to emulate JETRO. Since then the two agencies have shared information and knowledge 
on a mutually beneficial basis. Overall, JETRO and KOTRA are quite similar in terms of their 
philosophy, organization and operations. Such similarity mitigates the biases in the empirical 
analysis arising from heterogeneity among the agencies of different countries. 
   In addition to being the first study to look at the impact of outward FDI promotion, we seek to 
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make significant methodological contributions to the broader empirical literature on the role of 
government agencies in promoting international business activities. Above all, we hope that our 
study will help to address a serious shortcoming of the existing literature, namely its inability to 
adequately address the endogeneity problem. For the most part, the earlier studies use the 
instrumental variable method to tackle endogeneity. However, the instruments they use are 
inappropriate and inadequate. For example, it is likely that geo-political and socio-economic 
variables not only influence the decision of the promotion agency to set up a branch in a 
particular country but also the level of investment and trade with that country. Indeed the same 
variables are often included as explanatory variables in investment and trade regressions. The 
shortcomings of instruments in the empirical analysis of promotion agencies are analogous to 
those encountered in the analysis of regional trade agreements (RTAs). As Baier and Bergstrand 
(2007) point out, most of the available instruments used in the empirical analysis of 
governmental institutions or agreements are less than fully convincing. 
   Our use of two home countries – Japan and Korea – in the empirical analysis differs from 
existing studies which typically focus on a single home country and can significantly mitigate the 
above endogeneity problem. If a single home country is used, it is difficult to control for country-
pair specific elements and host country specific elements. Omitting those elements from the 
regression equations creates endogeneity biases.2 Furthermore, our dataset consists of panel data. 
As highlighted by Baier and Bergstrand (2007), the use of panel data is especially effective in 
addressing endogeneity issues associated with evaluating governmental institutions or 
agreements. This is because the use of panel data enables us to control for both time-invariant 
country-pair specific elements and time-variant host country specific elements. As a result, our 
                                                              
2 Harding and Javorcik (2010) also focus on only US outward FDI but introduce time-variant host country dummy 
variables by adding one more dimension, i.e. industry. 
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estimates on the impacts of IPA on FDI would be econometrically more consistent. 
   In addition to tackling such endogeneity issues, our paper makes two additional contributions 
to the literature. First, we seek to clarify the mechanics of the relationship between IPA and FDI 
in greater detail. More specifically, we examine this relationship separately for high risk host 
countries and low risk host countries. This examination enables us to assess whether IPA has 
differential impact on FDI in the two groups of countries. Second, we investigate whether IPA 
has a differential impact on the outward FDI of smaller, less productive firms and the outward 
FDI of larger, more productive firms. To do so, we compare the impact of IPAs on FDI for listed 
companies versus unlisted companies since listed companies tend to be bigger and  more 
productive than unlisted companies. Both types of analysis, which represent original 
contributions to the empirical literature on the governmental promotion of international business 
activities, will help to shed light on exactly how outward FDI promotion influences outward FDI. 
   The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of JETRO and 
KOTRA overseas offices. In Section 3, we describe the empirical framework we use to 
investigate the impact of IPA offices on outward FDI. In Section 4, we report and discuss our 
main empirical results. Section 5 brings the paper to a close with some concluding observations. 
 
2 Overseas Office of JETRO and KOTRA 
   In this section, we provide an overview of the worldwide distribution of JETRO and KOTRA 
overseas offices. This information can be obtained from JETRO (1973, 2000, 2008), KOTRA 
(2002), and KOTRA website (Accessed in Apr. 10, 2010). Figure 1 depicts the change in the 
number of countries with JETRO and KOTRA overseas offices over time. JETRO started to set 
up overseas branches in the early 1950s, and KOTRA began doing so in the early 1960s. Since 
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then, the number of countries with JETRO and KOTRA branches has grown rapidly. By the early 
1970s, KOTRA had more or less caught up with JETRO in terms of the number of overseas 
offices. Since then, while KOTRA continued to set up new branches in various countries until 
the early 1980s, JETRO almost completely stopped doing so. As a result, KOTRA has surpassed 
JETRO in the number of overseas offices in recent years. JETRO currently has fewer than 60 
offices whereas KOTRA  has around 70. 
[Figure 1] 
   Table 1 shows the differences and similarities between the overseas offices of JETRO and 
KOTRA in greater detail. The table shows the worldwide location of JETRO and KOTRA 
overseas offices in 2008. There are three noteworthy features about the two agencies’ offices. 
First, both JETRO and KOTRA have offices in many countries across all regions, including Asia, 
Europe, North America, Latin America and Africa. Second, with the exception of Costa Rica, 
KOTRA has offices in all countries in which JETRO has offices. In addition, KOTRA has offices 
in some countries where JETRO does not have a presence. Therefore, KOTRA has more 
overseas offices than JETRO, as seen in Figure 1. Third, in particular KOTRA has a noticeably 
stronger presence in Africa and the Middle East than JETRO. While the number of KOTRA 
offices in Africa is still small at present, their number may increase in the near future as Korea 
expands its trade and investment with non-traditional markets. 
[Table 1] 
   Let us now take a closer look at the number of JETRO offices in each region and their 
evolution over time. [see Figure 2] Some clear patterns are visible in the inter-regional 
distribution of JETRO offices. Until the 1960s, JETRO set up its overseas offices mainly in 
America, but since then the number of offices in America has remained more or less constant. 
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The number of JETRO offices in Europe increased continuously until around 2000, but since 
then, it has gradually declined. The number of offices in Africa rose continuously until the 1960s, 
but it has fallen sharply since the 1990s. On the other hand, the number of JETRO offices in Asia 
has increased on a sustained basis. This reflects the rapid growth of Japan’s trade and investment 
linkages with developing Asia as a result of the region’s spectacular transformation into one of 
the main hubs of the world economy. Asia has experienced by far the fastest growth of JETRO 
offices and has recently replaced Europe as the region with the highest number of JETRO offices.  
[Figure 2] 
   Figure 3 shows the inter-regional distribution of KOTRA overseas offices and its evolution 
over time. Most KOTRA offices around the world were established before the early 1980s. Since 
then, however, the number of KOTRA offices in both Africa and America has gradually declined. 
KOTRA began to close some of its European offices around 2000. In contrast, Asia has 
experienced a continuous increase in the number of KOTRA offices. As was the case with 
JETRO, the sustained growth of KOTRA presence in Asia is a consequence of Korea’s fast-
growing economic linkages with the world’s fastest-growing region. In fact, by the 1970s, Asia 
had already become host to the largest number of KOTRA offices. 
  [Figure 3] 
 
3 Empirical Framework 
   In this section, we describe the empirical methodology and data we use to analyze the effect of 
JETRO and KOTRA on Japanese and Korean outward FDI, respectively. Broadly speaking, we 
apply an empirical model which is a widely used standard tool for analyzing international trade, 
namely the gravity model, to our analysis of outward FDI. A number of papers lend theoretical 
8 
 
justification for using the gravity model to analyze FDI rather than trade. [see, for example, 
Kleinert and Toubal (2010) and Yeaple (2009)]. The gravity equation for FDI is formalized as 
follows: 
 ln FDIij = β0 + Xi β1+Xj β2+ tij β3+ εij.  
where FDIij represents bilateral FDI of country i into country j, Xi and Xj are a vector of home 
country-specific elements and a vector of host country-specific elements, respectively, tij is a 
vector of country pair-specific elements, and ε is the disturbance term. 
   Explanatory variables in the traditional gravity models for trade include logs of home and host 
countries’ GDPs and log of the geographical distance between the two countries. There are 
intuitively plausible grounds for using such variables in gravity models for FDI. Home countries 
with bigger economies tend to export more and invest more. If the host country’s GDP, which is 
a proxy for domestic market size, is relatively large, that makes that country attractive for both 
foreign exporters and foreign investors. Finally, as Chen and Moore (2010) and Kleinert and 
Toubal (2010) point out, geographical distance is related not only to trade costs but also to fixed 
entry cost for investors. For example, Japanese and Korean investors are likely to be more 
familiar with the business culture and environment of neighboring Asian countries than more 
distant countries. The gravity equation for FDI now becomes: 
 ln FDIij = β0 + β1 ln GDPi + β2 ln GDPj + β3 ln Distanceij + εij, 
where GDPi is home country i’s GDP, GDPj is host country j’s GDP, and Distanceij is the 
geographical distance between home country i and host country j.  
   The central objective of our paper is to assess the impact of IPA on outward FDI. Therefore, we 
introduce an IPA dummy variable into the gravity equation for FDI as follows: 
 ln FDIij = β0 + β1 IPAij + β2 ln Distanceij + β3 ln GDPi + β4 ln GDPj + εij. 
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The presence of home-country IPA increases the availability of relevant information and 
knowledge about investing in the host country. A positive estimated coefficient of β1 implies that 
the presence of IPA boosts FDI by helping to reduce the fixed entry costs associated with 
investing abroad. 
   However, in the context of evaluating the impact of IPA, this equation suffers from a number of 
problems. Above all, it suffers from a serious endogeneity problem – i.e. unobserved 
heterogeneity in investment will be associated with the likelihood of IPA establishment. In 
particular, two factors may drive both investment and the establishment of IPA. The first has to 
do with country pair specific effects. For example, JETRO is more likely to set up offices in host 
countries with which Japan has a good relationship and close economic linkages. However, good 
relationship and close economic linkages also increase investment from Japanese firms. 
Therefore, unless we control for country pair specific effects, the disturbances are positively 
correlated with IPA dummy. This positive correlation leads to the overestimation of the IPA 
coefficient. The other source of endogeneity has to do with time-varying host country effects. For 
example, IPA is more likely to set up offices in countries which are experiencing an improvement 
in the investment climate over time. At the same time, firms from the IPA’s home country will 
find such countries more attractive and invest more in them. Again, the disturbance and IPA 
dummy are positively correlated, and the IPA coefficient will be overestimated.  
   The empirical analysis of regional trade agreements (RTAs) is subject to the same type of 
endogeneity issues so it would be useful to refer to that literature for possible solutions. In 
particular, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) take a close look at endogeneity in the analysis of the 
effect of RTAs on trade. Using instrumental variables is one way of dealing with endogeneity. 
Baier and Bergstrand try a wide array of economic and political instrument variables but 
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ultimately conclude that the instrument variable method is not reliable due to the lack of suitable 
instruments. For the most part, variables that are correlated cross-sectionally with the probability 
of two countries entering into an RTA are also correlated cross-sectionally with trade flows 
between the two countries. More accurate estimates of the impact of RTA can be obtained by 
using panel data with bilateral fixed effects. This estimation enables us to isolate the impact of 
RTA on bilateral trade from any time-invariant country pair specific effects, some of which are 
related with both bilateral trade and probability of RTA. 
   Based on Baier and Bergstrand’s insights, we re-formulate our estimation equation as follows. 
Adding subscript t for time, our first model can be re-written as: 
     ln FDIijt = β0 + β1 IPAijt-1 + β2 ln Distanceij + β3 ln GDPit + β4 ln GDPjt + ui + uj + ut + εijt.     (1) 
   In order to take the lagged effects of IPA into account and/or to tackle the simultaneous issue 
between FDI and IPA establishment, we use the value of the IPA dummy from the previous year. 
This model is the baseline model and does not take endogeneity into account at all. 
   Our second model takes care of only biases arising from time-varying host country effects by 
introducing host-year and home-year dummy variables: 
     ln FDIijt = β0 + β1 IPAijt-1 + β2 ln Distanceij + uit + uit + εijt.     (2) 
   Due to perfect multi-colinearity with the new dummy variables, home and host GDPs are 
dropped from the estimation equation. The introduction of the new dummy variables has one 
additional benefit. As Kleinert and Toubal (2010) point out, the theoretically based gravity 
equation for FDI includes host countries’ market capacity. The data for this variable are usually 
not available because it is related not only to the host country’s market size but also to the price 
index. Model (2) thus also helps to control for theoretical characteristics of the host country. 
   The last model accounts for biases arising from both country pair specific effects and time-
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varying host country effects by including both host/home time-variant dummy variables and 
country pair dummy variables as follows: 
     ln FDIijt = β0 + β1 IPAijt-1 + uij + uit + ujt + εijt.     (3) 
Due to the inclusion of country pair dummy variables, the geographical distance variable is 
dropped from the estimation equation. This model is expected to produce the most consistent 
estimators. 
   Our measure of bilateral FDI from country i to country j is the number of country i’s  
manufacturing affiliates in country j.3 Home countries are either Japan or Korea. Our sample of 
host countries consists of 112 countries and is listed in Appendix 1. Our sample period is 1989-
2006. The source of FDI data are “Overseas Japanese Companies Data” (Toyo Keizai Inc.) for 
Japan4 and “Korean Business Directory 2007/2008” (KOTRA) for Korea.5 The data sources for 
the other variables are as follows. The data for the IPA dummy are derived from the sources 
described in the previous section. Geographical distance is available from the CEPII website.  
   More specific details of our FDI data set are as follows. The Overseas Japanese Companies 
Data database covers foreign affiliates of Japanese firms. In 2006 this database included around 
20,000 overseas affiliates of Japanese firms in 130 countries. It provides information about the 
name of foreign affiliates and their parent firms, their location, and key corporate indicators such 
as capital, sales, and the number of employees. The underlying survey for the Korean Business 
Directory 2007/2008, which provides information about the activities of Korean multinational 
firms, was taken in October 2007. The directory indicates that there were around 9,000 overseas 
affiliates of Korean firms in 73 countries. The survey covers variables ranging from the name 
                                                              
3 In order to take its log, we add a very negligible value, 10-8. 
4 See the website 
 http://www.toyokeizai.net/shop/cdrom/kaigai_cd/detail/BI/0660130b1de80bc637ac64cba63ca12a/.  
5 See the website http://www.gpcbooks.co.kr/newmall/shop/item.php?it_id=908140001. 
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and contact information of parent firms, number of affiliate’s employees, and entry mode. Our 
sample firms include firms which are listed in the stock market as well as those which are not. 
 
4 Empirical Results 
   In this section, we report and discuss the main results which emerge from the empirical 
analysis described in the previous section. We look at results from four types of analysis – (1) 
baseline estimation which does not address endogeneity, (2) estimation which addresses 
endogeneity, (3) estimation which divides host countries according to the level of political risk, 
and (4) estimation which divides home-country firms into listed firms versus unlisted firms. 
 
4.1 Baseline Results 
   The result for equation (1), which does not address the endogeneity problem at all, is reported 
in column (I) in Table 2. The standard gravity variables have the expected signs – i.e. the 
estimated coefficient for host and home GDP is positive and the estimated coefficient of distance 
is negative – although host GDP is insignificant. The estimated coefficient for the IPA dummy, 
our key variable of interest, is significant and positive. The IPA dummy takes a value of one if 
the country hosts at least one IPA office and zero otherwise. This result indicates that the 
presence of home country IPA in a country encourages home country firms to invest in that 
country. More specifically, home-country IPA increases the number of home-country firm 
affiliates by 1,721% (=exp(2.902)-1), which is exceptionally high. 
[Table 2] 
   We also examine more lagged effects of IPA. In the above estimation, we examined one-year 
lagged effects of IPA. However, firms may decide to invest in a country a few years after the 
13 
 
establishment of an IPA office. In order to take this possibility into account, we introduce three-
year and five-year lagged IPA dummy variables. The results are reported in columns (II) and (III). 
The coefficient for host GDP is significant and positive in column (III). The IPA dummy remains 
significant and positive in both columns (II) and (III). Comparing the magnitude of coefficients 
for IPA dummy in columns (I)-(III) suggests that the effect of IPA declines over time. The 
increase of home-country firm affiliates is 1,721% one year after the establishment of a home-
country IPA office, 1,447% after three years and 1,152% five years after.  
   In addition, we experiment with the number of IPA offices, rather than a dummy variable for 
whether or not it exists, as the explanatory variables. The results for this exercise are reported in 
column (IV). Some countries host multiple JETRO or KOTRA offices although most countries 
host a single office.  For instance, KOTRA had nine offices in both the US and China in 2005, in 
addition to three offices in Russia. JETRO had six offices in the US and five in China in 2005. 
The model in column (IV) examines whether or not the number of IPA offices matters for 
attracting FDIs. The estimated coefficient for the number of IPA offices is significant and 
positive, indicating that firms are more likely to invest in countries with a larger number of IPA 
offices. More specifically, a 10% increase in the number of home-country IPA offices leads to a 
1.6% increase in the number of home-country firm affiliates. 
 
4.2 More Consistent Estimators 
   Table 3 reports the estimation result of equation (2), i.e. the model which takes care of only 
biases from unobservable host and home country effects by introducing time-varying host and 
home country dummy variables. The results are qualitatively the same as those in Table 2. IPA 
dummies and the number of IPA offices remain significant and positive. The number of home-
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country firm affiliates is 702% greater with the establishment of a home-country IPA office 
(Column I). Furthermore, a 10% increase in the number of IPA offices leads to 1.1% increase in 
the number of affiliates. As in the baseline case, the magnitude of estimated coefficients for the 
IPA dummies decreases for longer time lags. The significant result is that the magnitude of all 
estimated IPA coefficients is smaller in Table 3 than in Table 2. In other words, as predicted 
earlier, failure to control for endogeneity biases from unobservable host and home country 
effects leads to overestimation of the IPA coefficients. However, the magnitudes of the estimated 
IPA coefficients still look implausibly large. 
[Table 3] 
   The results for the estimation of equation (3) are reported in Table 4. This equation, which is 
our preferred specification, accounts for biases from not only unobservable host and home 
country effects but also unobservable country pair effects. Strikingly, all coefficients for IPA 
variables now turn out to be insignificant. In other words, we cannot observe any positive impact 
of IPA offices once we control for both sources of endogeneity. Equivalently, the positive impact 
of IPA on outward FDI that we found by estimating equations (1) and (2) is due to endogeneity 
biases which reflect factors driving both investment levels and the decision to set up an IPA 
office.  Our results resoundingly suggest that accurately measuring the impact of IPA on outward 
requires carefully addressing endogeneity problems. At a broader level, our evidence indicates 
that accurately measuring the effect of governmental and semi-governmental agencies on 
business activities requires adequately controlling for endogeneity biases. Failure to do so will 
result in substantial overestimation of the impact of those agencies. 
[Table 4] 
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4.3 Political Risk 
   In this subsection, we examine whether or not the impact of IPA on FDI depends on host 
country characteristics, specifically the level of political risk, which is closely related with the 
level of business risks. Intuitively, the impact of IPA on FDI should be larger for investment into 
countries with higher business risks. We divide our sample host countries into two groups – low 
political risk countries and high political risk countries. We use the political risk index from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). In this index, a larger value indicates a lower political 
risk. By using this index, we first calculate the average of political risk in each country over time 
and then calculate its median among all sample countries. Finally, we classify countries with 
higher-than-median average political risk as low political risk countries and the other countries as 
high political risk countries. The level of risk in each country is listed in Appendix 1. We only 
report the estimation results of model (3) which addresses both kinds of endogeneity biases. 
   The results are reported in Table 5, which shows that the estimated coefficient for IPA variables 
– both dummy and number of offices – is positive and significant only in the sub-sample of host 
countries with high political risks. Specifically, home-country IPA increases the number of 
home-country firm affiliates by 417% or a 10% increase in the number of IPA offices leads to 0.9% 
increase in the number of affiliates. This implies that that the existence of home-country IPA 
offices in high-risk countries helps home-country firms to invest in these countries. In contrast, 
in the sub-sample of low risk host countries, the IPA variables are negative and significant, which 
is puzzling and difficult to interpret. It is unlikely that the presence of home country IPA 
discourages investment by home country firms in low risk host countries. But, at a minimum, our 
findings suggest that IPAs have a more positive effect on investment in high risk host countries 
than in low risk host countries. 
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[Table 5] 
     In this last subsection of the empirical analysis, we further examine whether or not the 
impacts of IPA on FDI differ between listed firms versus unlisted firms. As Chen and Moore 
(2010) show, more productive firms are capable of investing in countries with the less favorable 
environment for FDI in terms of larger market size, larger trade costs, smaller fixed entry costs, 
and lower wages. In other words, more productive firms are more likely to invest in countries 
even without the benefit of home-country IPAs. That is, the impact of IPA on FDI is expected to 
be larger for less productive firms than for more productive firms. To examine this hypothesis, 
we estimate the above models for FDIs separately for listed firms and unlisted firms. 
Unfortunately, our dataset includes only limited and incomplete information on key corporate 
indicators such as employment, capital, sales, or productivity. However, the dataset does allow us 
to identify whether or not each overseas affiliate belongs to a parent company listed in Japanese 
or Korean stock market. Since the listed companies tend to be bigger and more productive than 
unlisted companies, this classification based on stock market listing is one way of dividing home 
country firms in terms of size and productivity. 
   As can be seen in Table 6, the results are largely consistent with our expectation. IPA variables 
are positive and significant only for unlisted firms investing in high risk host countries. That is, 
our earlier finding of a greater positive effect of home country IPAs on home country investment 
in high risk host countries is limited to investment by unlisted home country firms. The presence 
of home country IPAs can provide useful local information as well as a psychological sense of 
security for smaller and less productive home country firms venturing into host countries with 
difficult political and business environments. On the other hand, home country IPAs are likely to 
be less beneficial for bigger and more productive home country firms, which have more 
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resources and better capacity to invest in challenging host countries. Therefore, our finding that 
IPAs have a higher effect for unlisted firms is plausible and consistent with economic intuition. 
[Table 6] 
   Finally, as a robustness check, we introduce one more independent variable, Treaty. This 
dummy takes the value of one if two countries conclude a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) or 
double taxation treaty (DTT) and zero otherwise. Bilateral investment treaties are agreements 
between two countries for the reciprocal encouragement, promotion and protection of 
investments in each other’s territories by companies based in either country.  Double taxation 
treaties are conventions between two countries that aim to eliminate the double taxation of 
income or gains arising in one territory and paid to residents of another territory. Information on 
BIT and DTT is available from the UNCTAD website.6 These two treaties contribute to reducing 
the fixed entry cost of FDI and thus promote FDIs. Again, this dummy is lagged one year to 
prevent simultaneity problems [see Appendices 2 and 3]. The results of this exercise, which are 
reported in Table 7, are qualitatively the same as those in Table 6. Interestingly, the treaty dummy 
is positive and significant only for unlisted home country firms investing in high risk host 
countries. Therefore, overall, IPAs and investment treaties are more beneficial for smaller and 
less productive firms venturing into high risk countries. 
[Table 7] 
 
5 Concluding Observations 
   Governmental and semi-governmental agencies have long been active in promoting 
international business activities. In particular, they have attempted to expand exports from their 
                                                              
6 http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2344&lang=1 for BIT;  
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=4505&lang=1 for DTT. 
18 
 
countries and attract FDI inflows into their countries. This is because exports and inward FDI 
have traditionally been viewed as more beneficial for growth and development than imports and 
outward FDI. Mirroring this widespread perception, most empirical analyses of governmental 
promotion of international business activities have largely been limited to the effect of export 
promotion and inward FDI promotion. By and large, the balance of evidence from those studies 
indicates that export promotion has been effective in boosting exports and inward FDI promotion 
has been effective in boosting FDI inflows. More recently, there is a growing recognition that 
imports and outward FDI can yield substantial benefits for productivity and growth. For example, 
imports of capital goods embodying superior technology from advanced economies can help lift 
up the technological capabilities of the importing country’s firms and industries. The acquisition 
of superior technology through outward FDI can generate similar benefits. In line with the 
growing recognition of the potentially sizable economic benefits of imports and outward FDI, 
some governments have also begun to promote imports and outward FDI.  
   At a broader level, our primary contribution to the empirical literature on the role of 
governmental and semi-governmental agencies in cross-border business activities is that our 
study is the first to empirically investigate the effect of such agencies on outward FDI. To do so, 
we delve into the impact of JETRO and KOTRA on Japanese and Korean outward FDI, 
respectively. Intuitively, the role of governmental agencies in mitigating the large risk associated 
with venturing into foreign markets should be no less pertinent for outward FDI than it is for 
exports. An important stylized fact of the global economy – the recent emergence of developing 
countries, especially those in Asia, as globally significant exporters of capital and sources of 
outward FDI – renders our study especially timely and relevant for developing countries. In 
terms of methodological contribution, we seek to address the endogeneity problem inherent in 
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the effect of governmental institutions or agreements on international business activities by using 
panel data from two home countries. This allows us to control for both country pair time-
invariant characteristics and host country time-varying characteristics. 
   Our empirical results strongly confirm the importance of addressing the endogeneity problem 
in accurately measuring the impact of IPAs on outward FDI. In the baseline case, which assumes 
away the problem and does nothing to mitigate it, we find a significant positive effect of IPAs on 
outward FDI. That is, our results suggest that JETRO’s presence in the host country has a 
positive impact on the investments of Japanese firms in that country and likewise for KOTRA’s 
presence. When we take the intermediate approach of addressing only one source of endogeneity 
– biases from unobservable host (and home) country effects – the results are qualitatively the 
same as in the baseline case. However, the magnitude of the coefficients for IPA variables is 
smaller than in the baseline case. When we address both sources of endogeneity – both 
unobservable host (and home) country effects and unobservable country pair effects – all IPA 
variables become insignificant. Our results underline the importance of addressing endogeneity 
in the empirical analysis of the effect of governmental promotion of not only outward FDI but 
also exports, imports and inward FDI. Failure to do so will overstate the impact of governmental 
or semi-governmental agencies on international business activity. 
   In addition to alerting us to the need to mitigate endogeneity, our empirical analysis yields a 
couple of interesting and significant additional findings. When we divide our sample of host 
countries according to their level of political risk, which tends to be highly correlated with 
business risk, we find that IPA is more effective in politically very risky host countries. This 
implies that IPAs can help firms from their countries invest in countries with difficult political 
and business environments by providing them with relevant local information. The presence of 
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IPAs from their home countries can also give a psychological sense of security to investors 
venturing into risky and uncertain markets. However, this result differs between listed and 
unlisted firms. The positive effect of home-country IPA on investment in high-risk countries is 
limited to unlisted firms, which are typically smaller and less productive than  listed firms. This 
is intuitively plausible since the larger and more productive firms have more internal capacity 
and resources to navigate the turbulent waters of high-risk markets. 
   Our findings entail a number of policy implications. At the broadest level, our failure to find a 
significant positive effect of IPAs on outward FDI once we fully tackle endogeneity problems 
implies that the presence of home-country IPAs per se does not promote investment from home-
country firms. That is, setting up an IPA office in a country may or may not be effective in 
increasing investment into that country. Further analysis indicates that the returns to IPAs are 
higher for assisting small, less productive firms and for promoting investment in politically risky 
countries. In this context, it is interesting to note that encouraging small and enterprises (SMEs) 
to venture abroad has recently emerged as one of JETRO’s key policy objectives. Our evidence 
lends empirical support to JETRO’s singling out of SMEs as a group of firms which would 
benefit a lot from its assistance. Our evidence also implies that it is more productive for IPAs to 
locate their offices in high-risk countries than in low-risk countries. The policy implication for 
high-risk host countries is that attracting IPAs can lead to more investment from the IPAs’ home 
countries. Of course, the more fundamental long-term challenge for such countries is to reduce 
their political risk level but in the short run the presence of foreign IPAs can boost FDI inflows.  
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Appendix 1 
Host Countries 
 
  
Country Risk Country Risk Country Risk
Argentina Low Guyana High Philippines High
Australia Low Haiti High Poland Low
Austria Low Honduras High Portugal Low
Bangladesh High Hong Kong Low Puerto Rico
Barbados Hungary Low Qatar Low
Belgium and Luxembourg Low Iceland Low Romania Low
Bermuda India High Russian Federation High
Bolivia High Indonesia High Samoa
Brazil High Iran High Saudi Arabia High
British Virgin Islands Ireland Low Serbia and Montenegro High
Brunei Darussalam Low Israel High Singapore Low
Bulgaria Low Italy Low Slovakia Low
Burma High Jamaica Low South Africa Low
Cambodia Japan Low Spain Low
Canada Low Jordan High Sri Lanka High
Cayman Islands Kazakstan Low Sudan High
Chile Low Kenya High Swaziland
China High Korea Low Sweden Low
Colombia High Lao PDR Switzerland Low
Congo High Lebanon High Syrian Arab Republic High
Costa Rica Low Lithuania Low Taiwan Low
Croatia Low Luxembourg Low Tanzania, United Rep. of High
Czech Republic Low Macau (Aomen) Thailand Low
Cote d'Ivoire High Malaysia Low Trinidad and Tobago Low
Denmark Low Mauritius Tunisia Low
Dominican Republic High Mexico Low Turkey High
Ecuador High Mongolia Low Uganda High
Egypt High Morocco Low Ukraine High
El Salvador High Mozambique High United Arab Emirates Low
Ethiopia High Netherlands Low United Kingdom Low
Fiji New Zealand Low United States of America Low
Finland Low Nicaragua High Vanuatu
France Low Nigeria High Venezuela High
Gabon High Norway Low Viet Nam High
Germany Low Pakistan High Zambia High
Ghana High Panama High Zimbabwe High
Greece Low Papua New Guinea High
Guatemala High Peru High
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Appendix 2 
All BIT Partners and Year of Entry into Force 
 
Source: Country-specific Lists of BITs (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) 
Partner Year Partner Year Partner Year
Bangladesh 1999 Albania 2006 Lebanon 2006
Cambodia 2008 Algeria 2001 Malaysia 1989
China 1989 Argentina 1996 Mauritania 2006
Egypt 1978 Austria 1991 Mexico 2002
Hong Kong, China 1997 Bangladesh 1988 Mongolia 1991
Korea, Republic of 2003 Belarus 1997 Morocco 2001
Lao, PDR 2009 Bolivia 1997 Netherlands 2005
Mongolia 2002 Brunei Darussalam 2003 Nicaragua 2001
Pakistan 2002 Bulgaria 2006 Nigeria 1999
Peru 2009 Cambodia 1997 Oman 2004
Russian Federation 2000 Chile 1999 Pakistan 1990
Sri Lanka 1982 China 2007 Panama 2002
Turkey 1993 Costa Rica 2002 Paraguay 1993
Uzbekistan 2009 Croatia 2006 Peru 1994
VietNam 2004 Czech Republic 1995 Philippines 1996
Denmark 1988 Poland 1990
Egypt 1997 Portugal 1996
El Salvador 2002 Qatar 1999
Finland 1996 Russian Federation 1991
France 1979 Saudi 2003
Germany 1967 Senegal 1985
Greece 1995 Slovakia 2006
Guatemala 2002 South Africa 1997
Guyana 2006 Spain 1994
Honduras 2001 Sri Lanka 1980
Hong Kong, China 1997 Sweden 1997
Hungary 1990 Switzerland 2006
India 1996 Tajikistan 1995
Indonesia 1994 Thailand 1989
Iran, Islamic Republic of 2006 Trinidad Tobago 2003
Israel 2003 Tunisia 1975
Italy 1992 Turkey 1994
Japan 2003 Ukraine 1997
Jordan 2004 United Arab Emirates 2004
Kazakhstan 1996 United Kingdom 1976
Lao, PDR 1996 Uzbekistan 1992
Latvia 1997 VietNam 2004
Japan Korea
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Appendix 3 
All DTT Partners and Year of Entry into Force 
 
Source: Country-specific Lists of DTTs (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) 
Partner Year Partner Year Partner Year Partner Year
Argentina 1975 Philippines 2006 Albania 2006 Malaysia 1982
Australia 2008 Poland 1980 Algeria 2001 Malta 1997
Australia 1969 Romania 1976 Australia 1982 Mexico 1994
Australia 2007 Russian Federation 1986 Austria 1985 Mongolia 1992
Austria 1961 Seychelles 1970 Azerbaijan 2008 Morocco 1999
Bangladesh 1991 Singapore 1994 Bangladesh 1983 Myanmar 2002
Belgium 1968 Slovakia 1977 Belarus 2002 Nepal 2001
Bermuda 2010 South Africa 1997 Belgium 1996 Netherlands 1978
Brazil 1967 Spain 1974 Brazil 1989 New Zealand 1981
British Virgin Islands 1970 Sri Lanka 1967 Bulgaria 1994 Norway 1982
Brunei Darussalam 2009 Sweden 1983 Canada 2006 Oman 2005
Bulgaria 1991 Switzerland 1971 Chile 2002 Pakistan 1987
Canada 1964 Thailand 1990 China 1994 Papua New Guinea 1996
China 1975 Turkey 1993 Croatia 2002 Philippines 1984
Czech Republic 1977 United Kingdom 1969 Czech Republic 1992 Poland 1991
Denmark 1968 United States 1954 Denmark 1977 Portugal 1996
Egypt 1968 VietNam 1995 Egypt 1992 Romania 1993
Fiji 1970 Zambia 1970 Estonia 2009 Russian Federation 1992
Finland 1972 Fiji 1994 Saudi Arabia 2007
France 1995 Finland 1979 Singapore 1979
Germany 1966 France 1979 Slovakia 2001
Hungary 1980 Germany 2000 Slovenia 2005
India 1969 Greece 1995 South Africa 1995
Indonesia 1982 Hungary 1989 Spain 1994
Ireland 1974 Iceland 2008 Sri Lanka 1984
Israel 1993 India 1985 Sudan 2004
Italy 1969 Indonesia 1988 Sweden 1981
Kazakhstan 2008 Iran, Islamic Republic 2006 Switzerland 1980
Korea, Republic of 1998 Ireland 1990 Thailand 1974
Kuwait 2010 Israel 1997 Tunisia 1988
Luxembourg 1992 Italy 1989 Turkey 1983
Malaysia 1970 Japan 1998 Ukraine 1999
Mexico 1996 Jordan 2004 United Arab Emirates 2003
Moldova, Republic 1986 Kazakhstan 1997 United Kingdom 1996
Montserrat 1970 Kuwait 1998 United States 1976
Netherlands 1970 Lao PDR 2004 Uzbekistan 1998
New Zealand 1963 Latvia 2008 Venezuela 2006
Norway 1992 Lithuania 2006 VietNam 1994
Pakistan 1959 Luxembourg 1984
Japan Korea
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Table 1 
JETRO and KOTRA Overseas Offices in 2008 
 
Sources: JETRO (1973, 2000, 2008), KOTRA (2002), KOTRA website (Accessed in Apr. 10, 2010) 
JETRO KOTRA JETRO KOTRA
America Asia
Argentina X X Azerbaijan X
Brazil X X Bangladesh X X
Canada X X Burma X X
Chile X X Cambodia X
Colombia X X China X X
Costa Rica X India X X
Cuba X Indonesia X X
Dominican Republic X Iran X X
Guatemala X Iraq X
Mexico X X Israel X X
Panama X X Jordan X
Peru X X Kazakstan X
United States of America X X Kuwait X
Venezuela X X Malaysia X X
Pacific Oman X
Australia X X Pakistan X X
New Zealand X X Philippines X X
Europe Russian Federation X X
Austria X X Saudi Arabia X X
Belgium and Luxembourg X X Singapore X X
Croatia X Sri Lanka X X
Czech Republic X X Syrian Arab Republic X
Denmark X X Taiwan X
Finland X X Thailand X X
France X X United Arab Emirates X X
Germany X X Uzbekistan X X
Greece X Viet Nam X X
Hungary X X Africa
Italy X X Algeria X
Netherlands X X Egypt X X
Poland X X Kenya X X
Romania X X Libyan Arab Jamahiriya X
Spain X X Morocco X
Sweden X X Nigeria X X
Switzerland X X South Africa X X
Turkey X X Sudan X
Ukraine X
United Kingdom X X
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Table 2 
Estimation Results: Baseline Model 
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
IPA (t-1): Dummy 2.902***
[0.440]
IPA (t-3): Dummy 2.739***
[0.428]
IPA (t-5): Dummy 2.527***
[0.419]
IPA (t-1): Number 0.159***
[0.024]
Distance -12.425*** -12.575*** -12.619*** -12.381***
[1.651] [1.653] [1.655] [1.650]
Home GDP 8.498*** 8.554*** 8.465*** 8.491***
[0.687] [0.687] [0.687] [0.687]
Host GDP 0.770 0.794 0.836* 0.757
[0.483] [0.483] [0.483] [0.483]
Investor dummy YES YES YES YES
Host dummy YES YES YES YES
Year dummy YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,782 3,782 3,782 3,782
R-squared 0.6542 0.654 0.6535 0.6543  
Notes: ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. In parenthesis is a standard error. 
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Table 3 
Estimation Results: Controlling for Time-Variant Host and Home Country Effects 
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
IPA (t-1): Dummy 2.082***
[0.629]
IPA (t-3): Dummy 1.520**
[0.612]
IPA (t-5): Dummy 1.142*
[0.604]
IPA (t-1): Number 0.114***
[0.034]
Distance -10.615*** -10.710*** -10.731*** -10.583***
[1.933] [1.935] [1.937] [1.933]
Investor-Year dummy YES YES YES YES
Host-Year dummy YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,996 3,996 3,996 3,996
R-squared 0.7393 0.7387 0.7383 0.7393  
Notes: ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. In parenthesis is a standard error. 
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Table 4 
Estimation Results: Controlling for Time-Variant Host and Home Country Effects 
and Country-Pair Effects 
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
IPA (t-1): Dummy -0.126
[0.624]
IPA (t-3): Dummy -0.700
[0.609]
IPA (t-5): Dummy -0.802
[0.615]
IPA (t-1): Number -0.008
[0.034]
Investor-Year dummy YES YES YES YES
Host-Year dummy YES YES YES YES
Pair dummy YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,996 3,996 3,996 3,996
R-squared 0.9175 0.9175 0.9176 0.9175  
Notes: ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. In parenthesis is a standard error. 
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Table 5 
Estimation Results: High Risk Host Countries versus Low Risk Host Countries 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
IPA (t-1): Dummy -1.912** 1.643*
[0.785] [0.954]
IPA (t-3): Dummy -1.341* 0.673
[0.723] [0.957]
IPA (t-5): Dummy -0.459 -0.456
[0.705] [0.975]
IPA (t-1): Number -0.105** 0.087*
[0.043] [0.052]
Investor-Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Host-Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Pair dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,720 1,720 1,720 1,720 1,704 1,704 1,704 1,704
R-squared 0.9467 0.9466 0.9464 0.9468 0.9131 0.9128 0.9128 0.9131
Low Risk High Risk
 
Notes: ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. In parenthesis is a standard error. 
  
Table 6 
Estimation Results: Listed Firms versus Unlisted Firms 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
IPA (t-1): Dummy -2.314*** -0.622 0.262 1.678*
[0.780] [0.814] [0.949] [0.957]
IPA (t-1): Number -0.127*** -0.033 0.012 0.091*
[0.042] [0.044] [0.051] [0.052]
Investor-Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Host-Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Pair dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,720 1,720 1,720 1,720 1,704 1,704 1,704 1,704
R-squared 0.9496 0.9496 0.9426 0.9426 0.9134 0.9134 0.9109 0.9109
Listed firms Unlisted firmsListed firms Unlisted firms
Low Risk High Risk
 
Notes: ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. In parenthesis is a standard error. 
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Table 7 
Estimation Results with Treaty Dummy: Listed Firms versus Unlisted Firms 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
IPA (t-1): Dummy -2.318*** -0.690 0.023 2.013**
[0.782] [0.813] [0.950] [0.954]
IPA (t-1): Number -0.127*** -0.037 0.000 0.108**
[0.042] [0.044] [0.052] [0.052]
Treaty (t-1) -0.055 -0.058 -1.093* -1.093* -2.193*** -2.195*** 3.077*** 3.068***
[0.544] [0.544] [0.566] [0.566] [0.851] [0.851] [0.856] [0.855]
Investor-Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Host-Year dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Pair dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,720 1,720 1,720 1,720 1,704 1,704 1,704 1,704
R-squared 0.9496 0.9496 0.9429 0.9429 0.9142 0.9142 0.9123 0.9123
Listed firms Unlisted firmsListed firms Unlisted firms
Low Risk High Risk
 
Notes: ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. In parenthesis is a standard error. 
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Figure 1 
Changes in the Number of Countries with JETRO and KOTRA Overseas Offices 
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Sources: JETRO (1973, 2000, 2008), KOTRA (2002), KOTRA website (Accessed in Apr. 10, 2010) 
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Figure 2 
Number of Countries with JETRO Overseas Offices 
 
Sources: JETRO (1973, 2000, 2008) 
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Figure 3 
Number of Countries with KOTRA Overseas Offices 
Sources: KOTRA (2002), KOTRA website (Accessed in Apr. 10, 2010) 
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